MCAT Critical Analysis and Reasoning Skills Practice Test 13

While I would certainly not want to disparage the efforts of vegetarians to limit violence toward animals in their personal lives and in public institutions and practices involving the slaughter and consumption of animals, I think it is important also to underscore that vegetarianism is itself fundamentally deconstructible. Vegetarianism is not just a passion for other animals but a series of practices involving animals and a series of discourses about animals. And if we follow the logic of Derrida's thought on the question of the animal, then it is necessary both to support vegetarianism's progressive potential but also interrogate its limitations. I have already shown how animal ethics in general (and animal rights theory, in particular) tends to reinforce the very metaphysics of subjectivity it seeks to undercut inasmuch as animal ethicists rely on a shared subjectivity among human beings and animals to ground their theories. But there are other limitations in vegetarian and pro-animal practices that should be noted. First, no matter how rigorous one's vegetarianism might be, there is simply no way to nourish oneself in advanced, industrial countries that does not involve harm to animal life (and human life, as well) in direct and indirect forms.… Simply tracking the processes by which one's food gets to the table is enough to disabuse any consumer of the notion that a vegetarian diet is "cruelty free." As such, a vegetarian diet within the context of advanced, industrial societies is, at best, a significant challenge to dominant attitudes and practices toward animals, but it remains far from the kind of ethical idea it is sometimes purported to be. Second, there are other ethical stakes involved in eating that go beyond the effects consumption of meat and animal byproducts has on animals. All diets, even organic and vegetarian diets, have considerable negative effects on the natural environment and the human beings who produce and harvest food. Consequently, if we consider ethical vegetarianism to constitute an ethical stopping point, these other concerns will be overlooked. And it is precisely these other concerns, concerns about the other, often-overlooked forms of violence, that should also impassion a deconstructive approach to the question of the animal.

Although these critical points are certainly in line with the logic of a deconstructive approach to animal ethics, they do not form the focus of Derrida's analysis. Derrida draws attention, instead, to a different limitation to pro-animal ethics and politics, one that he associates with "interventionist violence" against animals. The violence at issue here takes a symbolic rather than literal form, and this symbolic violence against animals, Derrida seems to think, is one of the most pressing philosophical and metaphysical issues facing thought today. In view of this notion of symbolic violence, he makes the following statement: "Vegetarians, too, partake of animals, even of men. They practice a different mode of denigration." What does he mean by this? Clearly, ethical vegetarianism aims at avoiding consumption of animal flesh-and presumably human flesh, as well. So, in what manner do vegetarians partake of animals and other beings toward which they aim to be nonviolent? Derrida's remark here is part of a complicated argument about the ethical questions concerning eating, incorporation, and violence toward the Other. While Derrida, like Levinas, posits a nonviolent opening to the Other … he does not believe that a wholly nonviolent relation with the Other is possible. On his line of thought, violence is irreducible in our relations with the Other, if by nonviolence we mean a thought and practice relating to the Other that respects fully the alterity of the Other. In order to speak and think about or related to the Other, the Other must-to some extent-be appropriated and violated, even if only symbolically. How does one respect the singularity of the Other without betraying that alterity? Any act of identification, naming, or relation is a betrayal of and a violence toward the Other. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that such violence is immoral or that all forms of violence are equivalent.… [Within vegetarianism] the ethical question should not be "How do I achieve an ethically pure, cruelty-free diet?" but rather, "What is the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating" to animals and other Others?

Material used in this particular passage has been adapted from the following source:

M. Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. © 2008 by Columbia University Press.

1. Which of the following assertions is/are made in the passage?

I. Derrida believes that symbolic violence against animals is currently one of the most important issues in metaphysical thought.

II. Symbolic violence against the Other is as bad as literal violence.

III. Eating in an advanced industrialized society inherently entails harming others.

• A. II only
• B. I and II only
• C. I and III only
• D. I, II, and III

2. The author most likely believes that:

• A. vegetarianism is pointless since it cannot be freed from a relation of cruelty with the Other.
• B. Levinas is short-sighted in believing a non-violent relationship with the Other is possible.
• C. vegetarianism is noble in its efforts to limit violence against human and nonhuman animals, but it is not above questioning and criticism.
• D. Derrida is overly extreme in asserting that "vegetarians partake of animals, even men."

3. Suppose that a young girl rescues a formerly abused greyhound dog from an animal shelter. She names him Odysseus after the Greek explorer to honor the dog's past and celebrate his arrival in a safe and loving home. Based on information provided in the passage, how would Derrida respond to this situation?

• A. Derrida would allow that, even though the act of naming entails treating the animal as Other, the respect signified by the name balances against the violence done to the dog in the past.
• B. He would point out that even naming the Other is an act of violence, albeit a symbolic one, no matter what the intention behind the name.
• C. He would praise the girl for choosing such a historically significant and noble name, saying that this reflects her love of animals.
• D. Derrida would criticize the girl for committing an act of violence as severe as those committed by the dog's former owners.

4. What definition of the word disabuse (paragraph 1) best fits in the context of the passage?

• A. Treating something kindly and/or healing it after a period of abuse
• B. Chastising someone for misguided views
• C. Affirming someone's views
• D. Convincing a person that his or her views are fallacious

5. What is the primary purpose of the passage?

• A. To question the Derridian view of animals as Others to whom we owe an ethical responsibility, whether we are vegetarians or not
• B. To critique, with the help of Derrida's philosophy, the central motivations of vegetarianism and to suggest a new basis for a discussion concerning how best to treat animals
• C. To suggest that vegetarianism is fundamentally misguided since nobody can practice a completely cruelty free diet
• D. To interrogate the notion of ethical purity and argue that such a state of being is impossible

6. All of the following are claims made by the author EXCEPT:

• A. ethical vegetarianism aims to avoid the consumption of animal and human flesh.
• B. vegetarianism remains far from the ethical ideal it is purported to be.
• C. animal ethicists rely on a shared subjectivity between humans and animals to ground their theories.
• D. vegetarianism is fundamentally deconstructive.

7. The author provides the most support for which of the following claims?

• A. Derrida draws attention to a limitation of pro-animal ethics which is associated with interventionist violence.
• B. There is simply no way to feed oneself in advanced, industrialized countries without causing some harm to animal life.
• C. All diets have considerably negative effects on the environment and on the humans who produce and harvest food.
• D. Vegetarians are not as ethically pure as vegans, who avoid all animal byproducts in their diets, thereby reducing their environmental harm.